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Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5 (Feb. 25, 2010)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE –RELIEF FROM UNDERLYING JUDGMENT BASED ON 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
 
 The Court clarifies and explains  the procedure announced in Huneycutt v. Huneycutt
Summary 
2 for 
seeking a remand to the district court to alter, vacate, or otherwise modify or change a district 
court order or judgment after an appeal to the Supreme Court has been perfected.  Additionally, 
the Court explains that the perfection of the appeal does not toll the six-month period for seeking 
NRCP 60(b)(2) relief.   
 The perfection of an appeal does not toll NRCP 60(b)(2)’s six-month period for seeking 
relief.  Accordingly, the appellants' request for NRCP 60(b)(2) relief was denied as untimely.   
Disposition/Outcome  
 Appellants Ronald Foster, Patrick Cochrane, and Frederick Dornan challenge a final 
judgment filed on August 29, 2007.  Appellants filed their notice of appeal on September 7, 
2007.  On July 29, 2009, Appellants filed a motion in the district court, seeking relief from that 
judgment under NRCP 60(b)(2) based on newly discovered evidence.  Specifically, they sought 
to have the district court certify its intent to grant their motion.  After the district court certified 
its intent to grant the motion, appellants filed a motion in the Supreme Court seeking to have the 
matter remanded for the entry of an order granting their motion for NRCP 60(b)(2) relief in 
accordance with the procedure established in Huneycutt.       
Factual and Procedural History 
Procedure for seeking a remand to district court 
Discussion 
 In Huneycutt, the court adopted a procedure where a party, believing a basis exists to 
alter, vacate, or otherwise modify an order or judgment challenged on appeal after an appeal 
from that order or judgment has been perfected, must first file a motion for relief from the order 
or judgment in district court prior to filing a motion for remand in the Supreme Court.3
                                                            
1 By Anthony R. Sassi 
  Despite 
the general rule that the perfection of an appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction, the 
district court retains a limited jurisdiction to review motions made in accordance with this 
2 Huneycutt v. Huneycutt, 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978).   
3 Id. at 79-81, 575 P.2d at 585-86.  
procedure,4 but it lacks jurisdiction to enter an order granting such a motion.5  However, the 
district court does have jurisdiction to deny such requests.6
 If the district court is inclined to grant the relief requested, then it may certify its intent to 
do so.
 
7  At this point, the moving party then files a motion in the Supreme Court, attaching the 
district court’s certification, seeking remand for entry of an order granting the requested relief.8  
If the district court is not inclined to grant relief, it may enter an order denying the motion.9
Foster, Cochrane, and Dornan’s motion for remand 
 
 In the present motion the district court certified its intent to grant appellants NRCP 
60(b)(2) motion.  Appellants now move the Nevada Supreme Court to remand the matter for 
entry of an order granting the relief requested.  They assert, among other things, that their motion 
was timely. 
 A motion for relief from a final order or judgment based on newly discovered evidence 
must “be made within a reasonable time, and … not more than 6 months after the proceeding 
was taken or the date that written notice of entry of the final judgment was served.”10
Federal court opinion on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which was substantially similar to NRCP 60(b) 
prior to the 2007 revisions,
  Here the 
notice of entry of final judgment was entered on August 29, 2007, but appellants' NRCP 60(b)(2) 
motion was not filed until  July, 29, 2009.  This issue then is whether the perfection of the appeal 
tolls the running of NRCP 60(b)’s six-month limit.  
11 overwhelmingly concludes that the period for seeking relief under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is not tolled by the filing of a notice of appeal.12
 Because appellants' pending appeal did not toll the six-month period for seeking relief, 
appellants' motion for NRCP 60(b)(2) relief was untimely filed.  Therefore the motion is denied.     
  This court finds the 
federal approach to be sound practice and adopts the same approach with regard to requests for 
relief under NRCP 60(b).  Accordingly the six-month time period for seeking relief under NRCP 
60(b) is not tolled by the perfection of an appeal. 
                                                            
4 See Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 855-56, 138 P.3d 525, 529-30 (2006); Huneycutt, 94 Nev. 79 at 80-81, 
575 P.2d at 585-86. 
5 See id., 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585; King v. First Am. Investigations, 287 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2002); Fed. Land 
Bank of St. Louis v. Cupples Bros., 889 F.2d 764, 766-67 (8th Cir. 1989).    
6 King, 287 F.3d at 94; Fed. Land Bank, 889 F.2d at 766.   
7 Mack-Manly, 122 Nev. at 855, 138 P.3d at 530; Huneycutt, 94 Nev. at 81, 575 P.2d at 586.   
8 See Mack-Manley, 122 Nev. at 856, 138 P.3d at 530 (noting the court’s discretion to grant a motion seeking 
remand to the district court); see also Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that appellate 
courts do not rubber-stamp or grant such motions as a matter of course.). 
9 King,287 F.3d at 94; Fed. Land Bank, 889 F.2d at 766. 
10 NEV. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
11 Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 834, 122 P.3d 1252, 1253 (2005). 
12 See Tool Box  v. Ogden City Corp., 419 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 2005); King, 287 F.3d at 94; Berkwin Grain v. 
Ill. Dept. of Agric., 189 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Fed. Land Bank, 889 F.2d at 766-77; Nevitt v. United States, 
886 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1989); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 1987); Carr v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 543 F.2d 917, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Transit Cas. v. Sec. Trust, 441 F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 1971); see 
also 12 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL. MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶60.65[2][d] (3d ed. 2009) (stating that “virtually 
all courts agree that a pending appeal does not toll” the Rule 60(b) time limit).   
 The Huneycutt remand procedure is clarified specifically noting that district courts do 
have jurisdiction to deny requests for relief under NRCP 60(b).  Additionally the six-month time 
period for seeking relief under NRCP 60(b) is not tolled by the perfection of an appeal. 
Conclusion 
